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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2, by and 
through the Utah Supreme Court's authority to pour over cases under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0)-
This jurisdiction is limited, however, to the scope of the issues raised in the appellants' 
(Swansons') Notice of Appeal. That notice indicates that Swansons appeal from the judgment 
entered in this matter on November 10,1997, (R. 397-89) granting Rule 54(b) certification and 
denying Rule 60(b) relief. R. 406. Swansons have stated in their docketing statement and in 
their brief that they are appealing from the district court's denial of summary judgment. 
Appealing from these issues exceeds the scope of their notice of appeal, which scope is required 
to be defined by Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As that scope is limited 
by the Notice of Appeal to the Rule 60(b) issues, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any 
issues beyond that, including the summary judgment issues raised in Swansons brief. The 
corporation discusses those issues below only alternatively should the Court rule that it has 
jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 
Inasmuch as the appellants ("Swansons") misstate the issues and, particularly, the 
applicable standards of review, they are restated here: 
1. Was the district court correct when it construed wSwansons' Rule 60(b)(7) 
motion against the individual defendants as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and then 
refused to consider that motion because it was untimely? This issues is 
v 
reviewed for correctness. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 
838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct App. 1992); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 
817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Was the district court correct when it refused to grant Swansons' Rule 60(b) (1) 
motion against the corporation on the grounds that there was no excusable 
neglect, either in the form of misconduct of Swansons' counsel or Swansons' 
own efforts to remediate that misconduct? This issue is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
3. Did the Swansons present a meritorious defense to the defendants' counter-
claims? This issue is reviewed for correctness. Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. 
Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). 
4. Was there sufficient evidence to support the district court's grant of both 
summary judgments? This matter is reviewed for correctness. Burningham v. 
Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases construing it governs this 
case. 
vi 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
I. FACTS 
This case arose out of a joint venture gone bad.1 The Plaintiffs, Chris Swanson 
("Chris") and Laurie Swanson ("Laurie") (collectively referred to as "Swansons"), and the 
individual Defendants, Beverly Swanson ("Beverly") and Clinton Swanson ("Clinton"), formed 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc., on March 9,1995, ("the corporation") for the purpose of owning 
and operating a restaurant business. Originally the parties anticipated that the business would 
engage in a small remodeling project. The parties agreed that there would be four shareholders, 
Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, Chris Swanson, and Laurie Shepard-Swanson, with 2500 
shares, or 25% of ownership, each. 
Swansons were to contribute their services m exchange for their shares m the 
corporation. They made minimal or no capital contributions to the corporation. Most of the 
capital had been contributed by Beverly and Clmton. The parties originally agreed that Chris 
would be president and a director, and Laune would be secretary. The parties also originally 
agreed that Chris would manage the day-to-day affairs of the business, and that neither Chris 
nor Laune were to receive compensation until the business was open and profitable. 
After commencing the remodeling project, the parties realized they would have to 
construct a new building altogether. This required that Beverly and Clinton contribute a 
!The facts recited here reflect the district court's findings, R. 232-225, and the unrebutted facts 
averred m the corporation's motion for summary judgment and supportmg affidavit. R. 216-211, 
162-158. They are not to be construed in a light most favorable to the Swansons, as they claim, for 
two reasons: (1) there are simply are no other facts in the record to construe, as Swansons offered 
none; and (2) the appropriate standard of review is not that governing summary judgments, as 
Swansons claim, but rather the abuse of discretion standard governing Rule 60(b)(1) rehef. The 
standard of review issues are addressed later m this brief. 
vn 
significant amount of property to the corporation as collateral for a loan. The parties also 
agreed to include individual Defendant, Nikki Shumway ("Nikki"), as a shareholder and officer. 
Chns specifically requested her participation because of her experience in the restaurant industry 
The parties then agreed to restructure the shares to reflect these changes. Of the total 
shares, Beverly was to own 39.5%, Clinton, 22.5%, Chns 19%, Nikki, 10%, and Laune, 9%. The 
parties also agreed that Beverly would be president, Nikki would be secretary, and that 
Swansons would no longer be officers. 
These changes are reflected in the Corporate Information sheet submitted with the 
application materials for an SBA loan in August or September of 1995. The loan application 
materials were entirely prepared by Chns. After the parties made these changes, and after the 
corporation obtained the loan, Chris remained in control of the day-to-day management of the 
business and of the construction of the building until the time he resigned in December, 1995. 
Chns retained Laune as bookkeeper and paid her wages without the authorization of 
the board of directors. The checks were made payable to Laune and himself. Chris also made 
other disbursements of funds without the authorization of the board of director^ These 
transactions involving corporate funds are documented in records, most of which remain in 
exclusive control of Chns and Laune. They refused to relinquish the records and account for 
several unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. 
On two occasions, Nikki discovered receipts of purchases made by the Swansons with 
corporate funds, and found that the purchases did not add up to the amount the Swansons 
reported they had spent. Nikki has also recovered cancelled checks wntten on corporate 
accounts that the Swansons had used for their personal purposes. 
viii 
Around December of 1995, the individual Defendants confronted Chris about the 
unaccounted for funds, and he resigned. Chris and Laurie no longer perform services for the 
business by their own choice. They have since moved from Utah. 
Chris and Laurie have a key to the restaurant and the individual Defendants have not 
denied them access to the property. Chris and Laurie have never direcdy asked for disclosure 
of day-to-day operations of the business. Beverly, Clinton, and Nikki had accountants examine 
what records they were able to retrieve from the Swansons. The records revealed that Chris and 
Laurie transferred the funds back and forth between three separate bank accounts. Altogether, 
about $30,000 to $56,000 of corporate funds remain unaccounted for. 
Stock certificates were issued April 15,1996, according to the structure described above. 
No other stock certificates were issued before then. The corporation is financially sound and 
free from any danger of insolvency. Since the beginning of her term as an officer, Nikki has 
provided competent, ongoing service to the corporation. 
Chris and Laurie had stored some items of their personal property at the Shumway 
home. None of it was ever converted to the use of Nikki or of the corporation. It was always 
available to Chris and Laurie. They have since retrieved the property. 
Over the past year Chris has contacted or threatened to contact a number of state 
agencies and business contacts, alleging that the corporation has engaged in a variety of 
violations of the law. Chris has stated that he has done this to force one or more of the 
individual defendants to "sit down with [him] and come to an agreement in principle," and has 
threatened that "there will be a point in the next few weeks that too much damage will have 
been done to go forward with the project." 
ix 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
As for how the legal posture of this case evolved, the district court's findings, R 397-89, 
reflect that this case has a procedural history devoid of virtually any action on the Swansons' 
part. They initiated the underlying action by filing a complaint against the corporation and 
individual defendants on May 10, 1996. R 48. The complaint alleged breach of contract, 
conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of unspecified sections of Utah corporate law, 
conversion, fraud and a derivative action to remove corporate officers. The corporation filed 
an answer and counterclaim on June 12, 1996. R. 93. The counterclaim prayer for an 
accounting, failure of consideration, declaratory judgment regarding share allocation and 
malicious prosecution. 
Nothing of substance happened in the file until November 5,1996, when the individual 
defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment. R. 111. No response was ever filed, 
and the district court entered partial summary judgment on December 9,1996. R. 137. Soon 
thereafter, the corporation filed its own motion for summary judgment on February 11,1997. 
R 145. This was followed by summary judgment in favor of the corporation issued on May 13, 
1997 R. 232. 
The only issue remaining after these summary judgments were issued was a factual 
matter regarding some of the Swansons' personalty left at the home of Nikki Shumway. As this 
matter was unrelated to the others and would need to be tried, the defendants moved for Rule 
54(b) certification on June 6 and June 18, 1997. R 252, 245. On June 27, 1997, Swansons 
notified the court that they had terminated their counsel Mark Stringer, R. 253, and on July 2, 
1997, new counsel appeared for Swansons R. 255. That same day Swansons moved for relief 
x 
under Rule 60(b)(1) from the corporation's judgment. R. 266 The corporation responded, 
detailing the repeated attempts it made through counsel to get Swansons to respond to the 
pleadings, discovery and the motion for summary judgment. R. 300 (affidavit of counsel), R 
294 (letter to Mr. Stringer dated August 16,1996), R 292 (letter to Mr. Strmger dated November 
7, 1996). Subsequentiy, Swansons filed a second motion under Rule 60(b)(7) to set aside the 
judgment for the individual defendants. R. 323. 
The matter was heard by Judge Schofteld on September 22,1997. At the hearing the 
Swansons proffered three additional affidavits, which the judge refused to admit. He denied 
both Rule 60(b) motions and granted Rule 54(b) certification on Nov. 10,1997. R. 397. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly denied the Swansons' motions for rule 60(b) relief from the 
summary judgments entered against them. Their Rule 60(b)(7) motion was properly styled by 
the district court as a Rule 60(b)(1). and as such was untimely. Their Rule 60(b)(1) motion was 
unsupported by sufficient evidence demonstrating excusable neglect. They presented no 
evidence corroborating their counsel s excuses as to why he failed to respond to the 
counterclaim and motion for summary judgment, and offered no evidence demonstrating their 
own diligence m shepherding their case. Counsel's actions were not so egregious that Swansons 
should be excused from his misconduct. Furthermore, Swanson failed to remedy the lack of 
earlier responses with diligent remedial actions Instead, they tiled untimely rebutting affidavits 
collaterally attacking the summary judgments As such, their Rule 60(b) (1) motion wa s properly 
denied by the district court, and it did not abuse its discretion. 
XI 
The Swansons other arguments lack merit. As a matter of law they did not have a 
meritorious defense to the counterclaims because they never answered them. Their attack on 
the sufficiency of the evidence was not raised below, and is inappropriate in a summary 
judgment context. 
xu 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN STYLING SWANSONS' MO-
TION AS A RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION. 
The Swansons claim that the proper standard of review in this matter is correctness, 
since (they contend) this is an appeal from a summary judgment. This reflects a facile reading 
of the record below. In reality, this is an appeal from the district court's denial of Swansons' 
Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from summary judgment for the corporation, and from the 
denial of their Rule 60(b)(1) motion (styled by them as a Rule 60(b)(7) motion) from partial 
summary judgment for the individual defendants. This brief concerns only the denial of the 
motion for relief from corporation's summary judgment since Judge Schofield bifurcated his 
ruling and denied the motion for different reasons as to each defendant. R. 397-89. Matters 
concerning the individual defendants are briefed in a separate companion brief to this one. 
Swansons moved below to set aside the corporation's summary judgment against them. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect; . . . or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect tiie finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or 
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 60(b). 
1 
The district court correctly denied the Swansons' Paile 60(b) motion as to the 
corporation. In its analysis, the court styled the Swansons' motion as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, 
as the motion really requested relief from excusable neglect. R. 387-86; 265. The court then 
found that the neglect in this instance was not excusable: no reply was ever filed to the 
corporation's counterclaim, nor was any reply ever filed to its motion for summary judgment. 
R. 393. The court found that over a year had passed since the time the Swansons filed their 
complaint up until the time they requested that Mr. Stringer be removed. R. 393-91. It also 
found that Mr. Stringer's averred illness was uncorroborated by independent evidence, R. 392, 
and Swansons made no averments regarding their own efforts in the matter in their motion 
R. 392. Nor did they make any representations that they were misled by counsel. R. 391. Based 
on these facts, and on the fact that the court found there to be no meritorious defense to the 
corporation's counterclaim, the motion was denied. R. 391. 
When considering how to style a Rule 60(b) motion, the parties' own labeling is 
ignored, and a court may construe the motion as it deems fit. A correctness standard of review 
applies to this analysis, and speaks only TO whether the district court properly characterized the 
Swansons' self-styled "60(b)" motion as a Rule 60(bj(l) motion. Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
& Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (proper styling of motion is matter of law, 
reviewed for correctness). Apart from the fact that Swansons specifically sought only Rule 
60(b)(1) relief in their memorandum supporting their motion,2 the standard is clear: Rule 
2The Swansons' memorandum specifically sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1), R. 265, yet in 
their brief they appear to claim that Rule 60(b)(7) should apply as an alternate remedy to set aside both 
judgments. App. Brief at 9-15. They scate that Rule 60(b)(7) should "especially" apply to the 
individual judgment, but do not disavow its application to the corporate judgment also. Id. at 15. Out 
of an abundance of caution the corporation briefs here why Ruie 60(b)(7) does not apply. 
60(b)(7) motions are disfavored and may only be brought in "unusual and exceptional 
circumstances." Id. at 387. The rule further provides that a Rule 60(b)(7) motion is 
appropriate only if no other remedy under Rule 60(b) (1) is available. The availability of such an 
alternate remedy precludes Rule 60(b)(7) relief. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties. 838 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
There is no question that the district court acted properly in using Rule 60(b) (l)'s 
excusable neglect standard rather than the catch-all standard of Rule 60(b)(7). In their motion 
the Swansons' cited Mr. Stringer's failure to act timely on their behalf. R. 265. They cite his 
neglect, and their inability to do anything about it, as grounds for relief. The district court acted 
on this characterization when conducting its analysis of what relief should be granted, and 
properly concluded that Rule 60(b)(1) was the applicable standard. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENY-
ING THE SWANSONS' RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION. 
Once a court determines which rule applies, the standard of review changes. Abuse of 
discretion, not correctness, is the proper standard for assessing a court's decision under Rule 
60(b)(1). This Court has recognized that the standard of review often can drive results in 
appeals. In this instance, the deference appellate panels give to the trial judge's discretion speaks 
to the integrity of the judiciary and the unique role of trial judges to exercise discretion. 
Swanson also appear to raise, for the first time on appeal, the contention that Mr. Stringer 
defrauded them as a result of his actions. An allegation of fraud would sound properly only under 
Rule 60(b)(3), which Swansons did not invoke below. Swansons could also have initiated an 
independent action based upon fraud, but did not do so. They are therefore precluded from doing 
so now. M.L. v. V.H.. 894 P.2d 1285,1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
3 
With respect to the abuse of discretion standard, "[t]here is discretion and then there 
is discretion." Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Fuller. 763 F.2d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 1985). Abuse of 
discretion is a malleable standard, often molded to the specific type of judgment facmg the 
district court. Fact-specific inquiries often convert the abuse of discretion standard into a clearly 
erroneous standard. When discretion turns on factual understandings underlying the decision, 
"the abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court of appeals 
would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual 
finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous.'5 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.» 110 S. 
Ct. 2447, 2458 (1990). It is for these reasons that discretion to review Rule 60(b)(1) motions 
has been characterized as "broad." Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382,387 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The Rule 60(b)(1) inquiry facing Judge Schofield in this case was clearly fact-driven. 
At base, the court had to determine if there was neglect (clearly a factfinding enterprise) and 
then whether it was excusable (only slightly less fact-driven). See Harris v. Tilley. 480 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1971)(district court's factual evaluations in denying new trial motion given great 
deference). Here, the court made several specific findings that command heightened deference: 
5. Despite repeated requests by defense counsel, no reply was ever filed to the 
corporations' counterclaim; 
6. Rather than default the Swansons, the corporation elected to file a motion for 
summary judgment, to which the Swansons never responded; 
4 
7. Swansons provided no independent verification of their averments that their 
former counsel, Mark Stringer, was so ill so as to be unable to adequately 
defend them; 
8. Swansons provided absolutely no evidence that they took any efforts on their 
own to move the case forward, and there was no evidence that they had done 
anything between May 1996 and June 1997. 
9. Swansons claimed that they first became aware of the motion for summary 
judgment on July 27, 1997, yet filed their Rule 60(b)(7) motion on July 23, 
1997. 
10. Swansons failed to produce any evidence that they were misled by their 
counsel. 
11. Swansons filed three affidavits the day of the hearing, which the opposing 
parties had no opportunity to review. 
12. Swansons adduced no facts indicating that they had a meritorious defense to 
the counterclaim. 
R. 395-91. 
These findings speak directly to the elements of Rule 60(b)(1): there was no excusable 
neglect (or, for that matter mistake, surprise, or inadvertence), and there were no "issues worthy 
of adjudication." Richins at 387. 
The findings also reflect the Swansons' credibility in their claims. For example, 
Swansons claim they found out about the motion for summary judgment after they filed their 
Rule 60(b)(7) motion. Inconsistencies such as this informed the court's discretion, leading it to 
conclude (correctly) that Swansons' post hoc efforts to shield themselves with Mr. Stringer's 
incompetence and to claim ignorance were insufficient and, at worst, deceptive. Furthermore, 
Swansons' lack of diligence was further evident through their failure, through counsel, to 
produce any evidence corroborating their claims until the afternoon of the hearing on the 
matter. It was disingenuous for the Swansons to pin their hopes on Mr. Stringer's incompe-
tence when, even after the damage was done, they failed to timely present their Rule 60(b)(1) 
case. See, e.g., Meldean's, Inc. v. Rivers, 410 So.2d 837, 840 n.4 (La. 1982)(trial court's denial 
of post-judgment motion affirmed when no evidence of attorney misconduct properly adduced). 
The court had all of this evidence and conduct before it, and made factual findings 
thereon. It was in a unique position to assess all of the facts and circumstances of the matter. 
It was able, based on these facts and circumstances, to find that there was neglect, and that it 
was not excusable. This is precisely the kind of factual analysis suited to the district court, and 
precisely the kind of adjudication that approaches a factual finding. It was better able to assess 
the facts, with the litigants before it, than could this panel adjudge from a cold transcript. See 
Roland Mach Co. v. Dresser Industr., 749 F.2d 380, 189 (7th Cir. 1984). As such, extreme 
deference is warranted by this Court in applying its abuse of discretion standard with respect 
to the fact-finding component of the district court's discretion. 
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III. SWANSONS SHOULD BE BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF THEIR FOR-
MER COUNSEL BELOW, THERE BEING N O EXIGENT OR EXTRAORDI-
NARY CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DISSOLVED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP.3 
The Swansons argue that Mr. Stringer, their former counsel below, did such a poor job 
representing them that they should not be bound by his actions. They appear to use this 
argument both as grounds for saying that their neglect was excusable under Rule 60(b)(1), and 
also as grounds for invoking the catch-all of Rule 60(b)(7). App. Br. at 12-15. They apparently 
claim that Mr. Stringer's actions were so egregious that this Court should remedy the injustice 
he visited upon them without regard to the excusable neglect standard imposed by Rule 60(b)(1) 
and Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P.2d 672,674-75 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken directly to this issue: "The general rule is that m 
civil cases a new trial will not be granted based upon the incompetence or negligence of one's 
own trial counsel. There are cases which recognize that under exigent or exceptional 
circumstances which appear to have resulted m an injustice, the court may be justified in 
granting a new trial. Maltby v. Cox Construction Co.. Utah, 598 P.2d 336 (1979), see the 
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Crockett which is concurred m by two other justices; 58 
Am.Jur.2d, New Trial § 160; 66 C J.S.. NewTnaJ § 82b." Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 
1982). 
3This section is common to the defense of both to the corporation and to the individual 
defendants. 
In his concurring opinion in Maltby. Justice Crockett relied on Garrett v. Osborn. 431 
P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1967). In that case, the trial court specifically found that the appellant had had 
no assistance of counsel whatsoever in his case. Counsel attended no conferences or hearings, 
and did not file a required trial brief. Garrett, 431 P.2d at 1013. The Colorado Supreme Court 
deemed this "palpable malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance . . . ." Id. Thus, the 
attorney's actions did not bind the client 
The cases the Swansons cite do not contradict Utah law on this point. The Wisconsin 
case, Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 108 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1961), treats only civil procedure, and as 
such is completely off point: it deals only with the proper legal standard a court should use when 
evaluating whether a judgment should be set aside because of counsel's negligence or other 
misconduct. The trial court in Paschong dismissed the movant's claim as a matter of law. The 
appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to exercise discretion in 
evaluating the movant's claim. Paschong, 108 N.W.2d at 673-74. 
The California case Swansons cite, Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co., 170 
Cal.App.3d 725 (1985), adopts the same position that the Utah Supreme Court took in Jennings: 
only extreme circumstances creating "a strong likelihood that an injustice has occurred . . .", 
Maltby, 598 P.2d at 342 (Crockett,}., concurring), justifies relief from counsel's misconduct. In 
Aldrich the lawyer in question abandoned his practice, and his client could not reach him. 
Aldrich issued from a lower California appellate panel, yet harmonizes with controlling 
California law on point: Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, 654 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1982) (attorney's utter 
failure to respond to discover}7 requests and orders to compel caused eventual dismissal as 
discovery sanction; client not relieved from attorney's misconduct) . That case requires the 
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attorney to commit "positive misconduct" in order for his client not be bound by his action or 
inaction. In Aldnch the trial court found such misconduct, and the appellate court affirmed. 
In Carroll the trial court did not find such misconduct, and the appellate court, once again, 
affirmed.4 Incidentally, the Cahfornia courts also require the aggrieved party to act diligently 
once counsel's error is discovered. This ameliorates any lack of diligence the client may have 
shown in not catching counsel's misconduct earlier, before dismissal. Aldnch at 740. The 
corporation has already discussed how poorly Swansons presented their case even after having 
discovered Mr. Stringer's alleged misconduct. 
The cases reveal that what really happens in those rare cases when a party is not bound 
by its lawyer's actions (or inaction) is that the lawyer-chent relationship disintegrates. In other 
words, the agency itself dissolves. "What [previous California cases] have in common is a total 
failure on the part of counsel to represent the client: each attorney had de facto substituted 
himself out of the case." Carroll. 654 P.2d at 779. Accord Sanford v. Anav Oil Co.. 686 P.2d 
566 (Wyo. 1984)(relief granted when attorney simply could not be located after suit was filed), 
Daley v. County of Butte. 38 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (attorney completely abandoned 
client for extraordinarily long time). In these exceptional cases relief has been granted In most 
cases, however, a lawyer's inattention to his caseload is insufficient, and if he or she shows any 
inclination toward continuing representation so as not "obliterate the existence of the attorney-
client relationship," Carroll, 654 P.2d at 779, the agency relationship is left undisturbed, and the 
client is bound thereby. 
^ h i s demonstrates the deference shown to trial courts in these matters, a deference already 
discussed m this brief. 
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This analysis is completely consistent with Utah law. An "attorney is the agent of the 
client and knowledge of any material fact possessed by the attorney is imputed to the client" 
Von Hake v. Thomas. 858 P.2d 193,194 n. 3 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Only destruction of that 
agency, either by the client or by extraordinary acts of delinquency by the attorney, can relieve 
the client of that imputation. This is why virtually every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue 
, including Utah, has expressed extreme hesitance to create any exception at all to a client being 
bound by his or her attorney. Some jurisdictions rely on the notion that in civil matters one 
chooses his or her attorney, and thus must live with that attorney's misconduct. See, e.g.. 
Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 308 NW.2d 887, 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) ("'Petitioner 
voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the 
consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent Any other notion would be 
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed 
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent. . . ."'Vquoting Link v Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 
633-34 (1962)). Other appellate panels, like Judge Schofield below, R.420 at 7, 10, express 
discomfort that an opposing litigant bear the brunt of counsel's lack of diligence instead of 
counsel itself, through a malpractice suit. See, e.g., id. (c"[X]f an attorney's conduct falls 
substantially below what is reasonable under the circumsiances, the clients remedy is agamst the 
attorney m a suit for malpractice. But keeping this suit alive merely because plaintiff should not 
be penalized for the omissions of his own attorney would be visiting the sins of plaintiff s lawyer 
upon the defendant.'")(quoting Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962)). Still 
others, like Utah's courts, simply invoke the general rule. 
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Whatever the reasoning, however, all courts state that the exception must be predicated 
on "extraordinary" or "exigent" circumstances, making such relief difficult to obtain indeed. 
This is true in cases with nearly identical facts to the one at bar. See, e.g., Bentozine. Inc. v. 
Green. 431 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)(counsel failed to file timely certificate of 
readiness, and case was dismissed; client was bound even though attorney acknowledged he had 
personal and health problems that caused his lack of diligence); Padilla v. Estate of Gnego. 830 
P.2d 1348 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (counsel failed to file discovery responses or opposition to 
discovery responses; no relief from summary judgment); see generally Incompetence of Counsel 
as Ground for Relief from State Court Civil Judgment. 64 A.L.R. 4th 323 §§ 11 & 13 
(1988)(collecting cases).5 
In this instance, Mr. Stringer did not abandon his practice, nor did he abandon the 
Swansons. The Swansons chose him to be their lawyer, and accepted the risk that he might 
not be diligent when they made that choice. Mr. Stringer made efforts to salvage the Swansons' 
case by sending a letter to counsel, R. 287, and submitting the affidavit upon which Swansons 
relied. R. 317. Mr. Stringer's excuses of health problems were completely uncorroborated, and 
thus he is much like the attorney in Leev Tolleson 502 So 2d 354, 356-57 (Ala 1987), who was 
unable to show what exact circumstances justified relief. Compounding the Swansons uphill 
5For other helpful cases on poim\ see Lee, v. Tolleson. 502 So.2d 354, 356-57 (Ala. 
1987)(movant failed to adduce evidence of how attorney's conduct was "deliberate'1 or was the 
"product of neglect," and absent such a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" the denial was 
affirmed): Lee Foundation v. Moran & Co. 157 S E.2d 804, 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)(heavy caseload, 
absence from state, and clear neglect insufficient for relief: denial affirmed); City and County of 
Honolulu v. Bennett. 627 P.2d 1136,1138 39 (Hawaii Ct. App 1981)(nothing m record to support 
allegation that trial strategy amounted to "extreme aggravation", the standard required by the court; 
denial affirmed); Soderling v. Hickok. 409 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(failure to file 
certificate of readmess insufficient for relief; denial affirmed'). 
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battle is their continued lack of diligence once they fired Mr. Stringer. As it stands, the record 
still lacks any evidence supporting their contention that they attempted to monitor Mr. Stringer, 
or that they acted appropriately once they hired new counsel. Judge Schofield's skeptical 
reaction to their case throughout the colloquy at the hearing, R. 420 at 7, was appropriate: the 
Swansons were delinquent, incredible, and untimely. They do not deserve the extraordinary 
justice meted to the few parties that have received rehef from attorney misconduct. The only 
justice here is for their belated attempts to upset the carts of the judiciary be stopped-now. 
They may sue Mr. Stringer, as Judge Schofield suggested, but the appellees do not deserve to 
suffer from misconduct they could do nothing about (indeed, as evidenced from the record, 
appellees bent over backwards to give Mr. Stringer every opportunity to present his defenses. 
R. 294, 292. This was nota default by ambush). Judge Schofield should be affirmed. 
IV. THE SWANSONS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
TO ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS, WHICH WAS YET 
ANOTHER REASON WHY THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
DENYING RULE 60(b) RELIEF. 
The district court also ruled that the Swansons had failed to present a meritorious 
defense to the defendants' counterclaims. A meritorious defense is required to make a prima 
facie showing that Rule 60(b) rehef is deserved. C""A meritorious defense is one which sets 
forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment 
different from the one entered."'" Enckson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147, 
1148 (Utah 1994Vquoting State v. Musselman, 667 P 2d 1053,1057 (Utah 1983)(quoting Lopez 
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v. Reserve Ins. Co.. 525 P.2d 1204,1206 (Colo. Ct App. 1974))). This Court considers whether 
such a defense exists under the correctness standard of review. Enckson. 882 P.2d at 1148. 
Here the district court was clearly correct. In other Rule 60(b) actions, facts alleged in 
either a proposed answer or the memorandum supporting the motion gauge the merit of any 
defenses. See, e.g.. Enckson at 1148-49 (proposed answer raised several valid affirmative 
defenses). Here, Swansons never filed any answer to the counterclaim. This in itself shows that 
there were no facts that could have resulted in a judgment in their favor. Nor did they raise any 
facts speaking to the merits in the Rule 60(b) memorandum. Rather, they simply discussed their 
relationship with counsel and the reasons why there was excusable neglect. In short, they utterly 
failed to address a required element for Rule 60(b) relief. With such a record before it, the 
district court had no choice but to rule as it did.6 
V. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE SWANSONS5 
CLAIM THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS. 
Swansons also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the summary 
judgments issued against them. This is an odd argument. First, it is not properly before this 
Court because it was not raised below. A direct challenge to a summary judgment once 
6Swansons appear to contend that they raised a meritorious defense to the summary judgment 
motions in the form of the three affidavits they attempted to introduce on the day of the hearing on 
the Rule 60(b) motions. They also contend that those affidavits established their own steps to 
ameliorate Mr. Stringer's incompetence. 
This issue is briefed in detail by the ^dividual defendants' companion brief, but the 
corporation would underscore that the district court was unpersuaded: as to the Swansons' dealing 
with Mr. Stringer, the court stated in its ruling that even weie the affidavits admitted, they would not 
estabhsh sufficient amehorative conduct. R 384. Furthermore, the district court was entirely correct 
in ruling that the affidavits should not have been admitted, late as they were. 
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judgment is issued is proper only in a Rule 59 or Rule 60(b) motion. Lee v. Tolleson. 502 So.2d 
354,356 (Ala. 1987). Swansons never raised a sufficiency challenge below (for good reason, for, 
as addressed immediately below, it is impossible). They cannot do so now on appeal. The 
entire section that addresses this issue in their brief, therefore, should be stricken as not 
addressing issues raised below and referring to evidence outside the record on appeal. 
The second reason this is an odd argument is that Rule 56 specifically states that 
summary judgment applies when there are no material factual disputes. Here, as a matter of law, 
there were no factual disputes, as no rebutting evidence whatsoever was presented to contest 
the facts adduced by both defendants in the presentation of their motions. Those facts were 
presented m proper form under the Rule, by affidavit, and are impervious to challenge as to 
form. Lacking any meritorious challenge as to form or substance in the record, those allegations 
are immune to a sufficiency attack. 
This is especially true given that at summary judgment no "evidence" is actually 
received: only factual disputes are determined. Burninghamv O t t 525 P 2d 620 (Utah 1974). 
For this reason evidentiary challenges at summary judgment simply do not exist. Id. A party 
could allege in affidavit extraordinary facts to support a motion for summary judgment, and, 
absent rebutting facts that create a dispute, still prevail. 
Here, no factual disputes existed because Swansons adduced no facts to create 
one. They would ask the Court to parse the facts adduced by the defendants, looking for 
inconsistencies or incredulities. This? Court may not do that (not that it would find any): a court 
may not consider the weight of the evidence before it at nummary judgment. Sporv Crested 
Butte Silver Mining, 740 P 2d 1304 (Utah 1987;. It simply must act as a determinei of disputes. 
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Absent disputes, summary judgment is appropriate. And here, no dispute exists because 
Swansons never adduced any facts whatsoever.7 
CONCLUSION 
Swansons believe they can make an end-run around the district court's judgments by 
raising issues not raised below and arguing that they are appealing from a summary judgment, 
not from denial of Rule 60(b) motions. In the process they completely miss the pomt of the 
ultimate ruling below. Granted, they are appealing pro se, but in this mstance that tactic has 
only obfuscated the clear issues before this Court. 
Judge Schofield did not abuse his discretion when he denied both Rule 60(b) motions. 
He made factual findings as to Mr. Stinger's and the Swansons' conduct that spoke directly to 
his ruling, and thus the ruling commands great deference from this Court. He found that 
neither counsel nor the Swansons demonstrated the kind of excusable neglect necessary for Rule 
60(b) relief. Swansons' attempts to obfuscate their appeal with out-of-record citations and 
impermissible legal theories (like sufficiency challenges at summary judgment) should not 
distract the Court from one core premise: Judge Schofield made a correct ruling after reviewing 
a complete record and affording all involved every chance contemplated under the rules of civil 
procedure and equity. He observed conscientious counsel who did everything possible, 
including foregoing default judgments in lieu of the more expensive, time-consuming and nsky 
summary judgment, to act within the bounds of propriety and fairness, all m an effort to 
7To the degree this issue deserves any more discussion, any sufficiency challenge has a 
marshaling requirement. Here, Swansons have utterly failed to marshal the evidence. 
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ameliorate the effects of Mr. Stringer's conduct. Judge Schofield's rulings should not be 
disturbed, and he should be affirmed in every respect. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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